




GREY AREAS IN GREEN GRABBING: SUBTLE AND 
INDIRECT INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLITICS AND LAND GRABS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 




© 2020, BORRAS, JUN 
 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode), which permits unrestricted 




IDRC Grant: 108696-001-Policy intersections: Strengthening bottom up accountability amidst 
land rush in Mali and Nigeria 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Land Use Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol
Grey areas in green grabbing: subtle and indirect interconnections between
climate change politics and land grabs and their implications for research
Jennifer C. Francoa,b, Saturnino M. Borras Jr.a,c,⁎
a College of Humanities and Development Studies (COHD) of China Agricultural University, Beijing, China
b Transnational Institute (TNI), Amsterdam, the Netherlands
c International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), PO Box 29776, 2502 LT, The Hague, the Netherlands






A B S T R A C T
This paper builds on the literature on green grabbing. It makes a fresh contribution by bringing in aspects of
green grabbing that are less visible and obvious. These are subtle, fluid and indirect interconnections between
climate change politics and land grabs. It is difficult to see these interconnections from an ‘either black or white’
perspective. It is likely that the extent of this ‘grey area’ intersection in terms of affected social relations, nature
and land use change is quite significant globally, even when such interconnections tend to operate below the
radar of dominant governance institutions and database tracking. This situation calls for more nuanced un-
derstanding of governance imperatives, and for constructing the necessary body of knowledge needed for ap-
propriate political intervention. This paper offers preliminary ways in which such interconnections can be seen
and understood, and their implications for research and politics explored. It concludes by way of a preliminary
discussion of the notion of ‘agrarian climate justice’ as a possible framework for formal governance or political
activism relevant to tackling such grey area interconnections.
1. Introduction
This paper builds on the initial and growing literature on green
grabbing – i.e., resource grabbing in the name of the environment
(Fairhead et al., 2012). It aims to expand and deepen the concept of
green grabbing by exploring the subtle, indirect, fluid, complex, and
often invisible interconnections between climate change politics and
global land grabs. In a way, this is a grey area in green grabbing. Being
less concrete and obvious does not make it less important and urgent;
quite the contrary. Because it is even more difficult to govern, the im-
peratives of having a better understanding of this grey area becomes
even more urgent and necessary. This paper offers a preliminary sketch
towards a better understanding of such complex interconnections. The
discussion in this paper flows from two basic assumptions.
First, the politics of climate change is an important area of inquiry
analytically distinct from ‘climate change’ per se. Our paper concerns
‘climate change politics’ broadly defined here as the dynamics within and
between the implicated spheres of social structures, institutions and
political agency – namely, social relations; policies, treaties, laws,
procedures, norms; projects, programs, narratives, ideas, advocacies,
social mobilizations and movements, rumors, or gossips – separately or
collectively, and among and between different social classes and groups
within the state and in society that set and shape the meanings of cli-
mate change, its causes and consequences, how it can be addressed, by
whom, where and when. Often, what is privileged in public debates and
academic research are formally constituted climate change policies or
projects officially labeled by powerful entities (state or non-state) as
climate change mitigation or adaptation measures, such as biofuels
policy or REDD+ .1 These are relevant to study, but these are not the
only important ones.
Climate change politics – especially those in informal and indirect
manifestations of climate change politics, and thus are often invisible –
require urgent, necessary and careful attention, academically and po-
litically. For example, rumors or gossip about a biofuel project that
would purportedly require vast tracts of land could trigger a frenzy of
land speculation among local or foreign individual or corporate en-
trepreneurs on the one hand, and/or panic among villagers on the other
hand. The politics of access, use and control of natural resources may be
altered dramatically – triggered not by climate change per se, but by
rumors, speculation, or spectacle. This was what exactly happened in
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several villages in Northern Shan State in Myanmar in 2012–2015 when
there was a rumor about a biofuels project that would require the
government taking about 300,000 acres of village lands.2 Rumors and
gossips about a new project or revival an old project for hydropower
dam building for climate change adaptation that could displace thou-
sands of villagers have similar effect: panic among villagers, land
speculation among elite entrepreneurs – as what has been happening in
Northern Shan State and Kachin State in Myanmar during the past ten
years (Lamb and Nga, 2017). An official order of ‘no dwelling zone’,
passed in the name of climate change-related disaster prevention, effort
along coastal areas can adversely affect the lives and livelihoods of
fishing-farming communities where villagers are prevented from
claiming their land (for farming and for landing spots for their fishing
activities), while big business are permitted to construct concrete
commercial buildings for tourism business – as in the case in central
Philippines in the aftermath of the 2013 typhoon Haiyan (Uson, 2017).
These are all dynamic political economic and ecological ripple effects
partly triggered when global climate change policies and initiatives hit
the ground and reshape the politics of resources, as Newell and Bumpus
(2012) explained.
What this means simply is that: it might be, it can be, that climate
change politics may or can displace or dispossess more people from their
land than actual climate change. Whether or not this is indeed the case,
and if so, to what extent is a much larger question –that is largely
empirical – than what can be tackled in this paper. The current paper’s
aim is to make a case that could warrant further empirical exploration
into such a research agenda, or at least a plea not to disqualify a priori
such an empirical research question.
Second, although in recent years global land grabbing has increas-
ingly fallen out of the global media spotlight, actual land grabbing may
not have necessarily slowed down or ceased, and those that got stalled
are not necessarily politically irrelevant. On the one hand, some large
global databases, such as the Land Matrix (Anseeuw et al., 2013) de-
monstrate decreasing number of cases and geographic area of land
deals principally because of adjustments in their definition of what can
be included or excluded in particular definitions of land grabs, and not
necessarily because the extent of land deals have decreased in real and
absolute terms (although this needs empirical validation). On the other
hand, many high profile corporate land deals never materialized as
planned or were later scaled back, stalled or withdrawn (see, e.g.,
Zoomers and Kaag, 2014). Still, many of these land deals made lasting,
wide-ranging and profound social, environmental and political impacts.
Corporations may withdraw from a specific geographic site, but the
early spectacle and the initial planning process of acquiring lands by
themselves may have already reshaped conditions of and for social
relations, nature and land use. Regardless of the actual status of a land
grab – whether pursued, withdrawn, or invented/imagined – such dy-
namic shifts around land investments recast the politics of resources
just the same. When an investor fails to mobilize its speculated financial
investment and abandons the investment plan, the affected villagers do
not necessarily or automatically get their access or control of such re-
sources back, nor do they lose the sense of insecurity, threat and pre-
carity. Even when an investment does not exist at all, but rather is
simply invented or imagined on paper as an elite ploy to get control of
resources, just the same, villagers’ access may be profoundly altered.
When the celebrated case of Karuturi Indian flower company stopped
operation in 2012, a few years after it boasted of setting up a massive
scale business in the Gambella region of Ethiopia (Gill, 2016; Shete and
Rutten, 2015), the national government just moved on to look for new
investors for the same site; for the villagers, the threat and insecurity
remains, as demonstrated by the continuation of social unrest, still
shaped by the lingering land politics that were first triggered by
Karuturi’s initial entry into the region (for a broad overview, see
Moreda, 2017).
This paper is informed by our more than a decade of uninterrupted
engagement with the research community interrogating the phenom-
enon of global land grabbing, with extensive fieldwork in Asia, Africa,
Latin America, Europe, inside China, as well as a concentrated field
research in 2014–2018 exploring climate change politics in Cambodia,
Myanmar and the Philippines. Before going into the main part of the
paper, a few words about land grab definition are warranted because
how one defines land grabbing is key to what one sees not just in the
land rush phenomenon, but also in the realm of climate change politics.
Defining ‘land grabs’ is not straightforward; it is politically con-
tested. Different quarters see the phenomenon differently. Competing
definitions have also evolved over time. For instance, the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) initially defined land grabs as involving
at least 10,000 ha, a foreign government, and a negative impact on the
food security of affected communities (see Borras et al., 2012), while
the International Land Coalition (ILC) and ILC member Oxfam em-
phasized land deals involving 1000 ha or more, and human rights im-
plications in terms of land deal procedures and impacts (Zagema,
2011). The analytical concepts and issues raised in these definitions are
important, and centrally focus on scale of land deals in terms of land
size, impact on local communities, and intervention of foreign powers.
A definition of land grabs has practical implications for database
building, and quantification of land deals. There are critical scholars
who have raised and debated these issues, such as Anseeuw et al.
(2013) and Scoones et al. (2013) and thus we will not re-run such in
this paper.
The definition we adopt in this paper is one that puts front and
center the character and scale of capital involved in a land deal, as well
as the nature of existing social relations and balance of power when and
where land deals come into play, and how these may be altered by both
formal procedures and wider political processes surrounding land deals,
among others. We adopt a definition of land grabbing that identifies it
as essentially ‘control grabbing’ (Borras et al., 2012: 851): “[C]ontem-
porary land grabbing is the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts
of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms
and forms that involve large-scale capital that often shifts resource use
orientation into extractive character.” This definition conceptualizes
land grabbing “whether for international or domestic purposes, as ca-
pital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises,
climate change mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources from
newer hubs of global capital” (ibid.). It therefore highlights the power
relations and politics embedded in social relations among antagonistic
social classes and groups who are competing for control of these natural
resources, while suggesting that the institutional bases for and forms
that land deals take are shaped by political contention and therefore
can vary significantly (land purchase, lease, joint venture or contract
farming, resulting in the expulsion of villagers or in villagers’ in-
corporation into the emerging enterprises (Xu, 2018), or not), from
place to place and over time. This approach broadens the discussion in
at least three ways, namely: (i) beyond the initial food crisis-centric
analysis of much of the scholarly literature and media coverage; (ii)
beyond the initial land-centric analysis to problematize grabbing of
water, seas, forest, and other resources such as carbon as well (Franco
et al., 2013); and (iii) beyond just foreign actors to include analysis of
domestic corporate actors and nation-states (Wolford et al., 2013), as
well as land grabbing inside the countries that are usually tagged as
origins of large-scale land investments, such as Brazil, Russia and China
(Cousins et al., 2018; see also Xu, 2018; Schoenberger et al., 2017).
Such a definition helps frame better our discussion about the subtle
interconnections between climate change politics and global land grabs.
2 Fieldwork by authors in Northern Shan State (in the general area north of
Kutkai, and near the border with China) in 2014-2018.
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2. Climate change politics could trigger or inspire land grabs and/
or spillover effects
As mentioned earlier, the interconnections between climate change
politics and land grabs may not always be obvious and palpable, but
these exist, nevertheless. These can be seen in at least three broad ways.
First, one phenomenon that links the global land rush and climate
change mitigation and adaptation politics albeit in indirect and subtle
ways is the rise in popularity, materially or discursively, of ‘flex crops
and commodities’ that have been enabled by climate change politics
(Borras et al., 2016).3 The multiple-ness and flexible-ness of uses of
certain crops – for food, animal feed, biofuel, and so on – such as corn,
sugarcane, and palm oil, for example, at a commercial scale can be real,
anticipated or imagined, and have important impact: the dramatic net
increase in the global production of these crops and commodities.
Producing these crops and commodities is usually done through large-
scale, industrial monocultures that require dramatically changing ex-
isting social relations around control and use of land, water and forests,
even when at times these incorporate individual smallholders through a
variety of contract growing schemes. The notion of flex crops helps
reveal underlying interconnectedness in terms of different sectoral
‘value chains’ that become entangled to form a ‘value web’, and truly
cross-border, international interconnectedness (see also Virchow et al.,
2014). A sugarcane plantation producing only sweeteners in Cambodia
is just as embedded as the sweetener-ethanol production system in
Brazil in the global ‘flex sugarcane complex’, as McKay et al. (2016)
demonstrated. A particular company operating a sugarcane plantation
and mill does not have to produce multiple products of sweeteners,
ethanol and others to be considered part of the ‘flex sugarcane com-
plex’; rather, the company is subsumed, objectively, within the global
complex of flex sugarcane. The global expansion of flex crops has de-
pended on recasting global land control. The expansion of sugarcane
plantations worldwide, including Brazil, Cambodia (McKay et al.,
2016), China and Myanmar (Borras et al., 2018); or the expansion of
corn production that links what has happened in the US corn belt
(Gillon, 2016) and how it has triggered spillover effects in distant places
such as in contemporary Northern Shan State in Myanmar (Woods,
2015) are (in)direct outcomes, intended or unintended, of changing
climate change politics. If there was no net increase in the demand for
vegetable oil for biofuel (for instance in the European Union due to its
mandatory blending policy, Franco et al., 2010), the global complex for
these commodity complexes would not have been as large as they are
today. Recent empirical studies on flex crops offer preliminary evidence
about the pivotal role played by climate change politics in the phe-
nomenal rise of commodity complexes, such as palm oil (Alonso-
Fradejas et al., 2016), sugarcane (McKay et al., 2016), corn (Gillon,
2016), and soya (Oliveira and Schneider, 2016). When the European
Union converted part of its rapeseed production to biodiesel feedstock
in response to biofuel mandatory blending policy, it had to replace its
original use with alternative vegetable oil: palm oil. Thus, even when
some enclaves of expansion of oil palm plantation in, for instance, Ni-
geria or Colombia do not directly include direct biodiesel production, it
does not mean that these local oil palm plantations are not embedded in
the ‘global palm oil-biodiesel complex’ (see Alonso-Fradejas et al.,
2016). When soya and sugarcane production expanded in Brazil, they
took over lands previously devoted to cattle ranching, while the latter
moved to engage in new forest clearing further into the Amazon. These
spillover effects and indirect interconnection dynamics have fueled com-
plicated debates over ‘indirect land use change’ (ILUC) – precisely be-
cause the connections are less direct and obvious, and are challenging
to govern (see Lapola et al., 2010 in the context of Brazil and ethanol
production). In this paper, we see ‘indirect land use change’ as invol-
ving social processes that connect climate change politics and land
grabs via web-like routes (as in ‘value web’, or ‘chain of chains’), rather
than via single straight lines (as in ‘value chains’). Again, at first glance,
connecting various hubs of production, circulation and consumption
across the globe via the concept of ‘flex crops’ may be a bit of a stretch,
but at closer inspection it becomes clearer that at the very least it is a
question that warrants deeper empirical investigation. Our hunch is
that the notion of ‘flex crops’ makes the ‘indirectness’ in ILUC less
subtle, or that indirect land use change (ILUC) is inherently entangled –
conceptually and materially – with global flex crops complexes. This
strategic relationship potentially exists, but is not yet fully explored
theoretically or empirically in the literature.
Second, the long-standing central state campaign to stop some forms
of agrarian production systems and ways of life, especially shifting
cultivation, pastoralism and some forms of artisanal fishing, has gained
renewed momentum recently amid resurging climate change politics.
The general assumption and insinuation, implicitly or explicitly, is that
these systems are ecologically destructive, even when evidence remains
contested (Mertz et al., 2017; Dressler et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2014;
Scheidel, 2018). Big conservation projects, REDD+, and other adap-
tation projects limit or altogether prohibit these traditional practices
largely by pushing villagers into land use change usually towards se-
dentary forms of production, which is usually carried out by dangling
formal, individualized private land titles. What this typically means in a
shifting agriculture context is a two-pronged onslaught. On the one
hand, sedentarization frees up large tracts of land to be picked-up
afterwards by agribusiness and/or big conservation organizations. On
the other hand, lands that remain in the hands of villagers that are
largely turned into sedentary cultivation are then converted in their
previous diverse land uses into boom crops (most of which are flex
crops) where social relations and production systems are largely capi-
talist, using industrial grade seeds, irrigation, chemicals, and post-
harvest infrastructure. Together, these are then implicitly or explicitly
considered as climate change mitigation and adaptation practices – the
flip-side of the ‘ecologically destructive’ shifting cultivation – although
one can argue that the land use shift brings these spaces into the fold of
the global industrial food system, one of the single biggest contributors
to GHG emissions (McMichael, 2013).
As Borras and Franco (2018) argued, climate change-related poli-
tical narratives about the purported ecologically destructive character of
some agrarian systems have dovetailed with another long-standing
narrative portraying these agrarian production systems as economically
inefficient. The latter is a cornerstone narrative underpinning much of
the contemporary land deals (World Bank, 2007; Deininger and
Byerlee, 2011). Combined together, these two narratives, i.e. econom-
ically inefficient and ecologically destructive agrarian systems, seem to
us to be informing the idea of ‘Climate Smart Agriculture’ (CSA) – a
project based on the fusion of two central obsessions in mainstream
economics: the quest for economic efficiency (technical, allocative and
distributive) on the one hand, and on the concern for environmental
sustainability on the other hand. CSA has three pillars, namely, ‘in-
creased productivity’, ‘increased resilience’, and ‘reduced emission’. But
it is completely silent on inequality, unequal power relations, and re-
distributive reforms (Borras and Franco, 2018; Clapp et al., 2018;
Newell and Taylor, 2018; Taylor, 2018). But such assumptions are not
beyond question. In their study of a land deal that was justified on the
basis of economic efficiency and environmental sustainability gains,
3 Flex crops and commodities are those that ‘have multiple uses (food, feed,
fuel, fibre, industrial material, etc.) that can be flexibly interchanged while
some consequent supply gaps can be filled by other flex crops. Flexibility arises
from multiple relationships among various crops, components and uses’ (Borras
et al., 2016: 94). Moreover, ‘Specific forms of flexible-ness and multiple-ness
can become more profitable through several means – e.g. changes in market
prices […], policy frameworks […] and technoscientific advance facilitating
conversion of non-edible feedstock […].’ Finally, ‘The latter’s economic viabi-
lity depends on low-cost feedstock, which can be cheapened by several means,
e.g. mining nature, super-exploitative labour, more intense market competition
and land grabs.’ Key examples are soya, sugarcane, oil palm, and corn (Borras
et al., 2016: 94).
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Richards and Lyons (2016: 209) found just the opposite outcome; they
concluded: “investor claims regarding the economic development and
environmental sustainability at the site level do not match with the
lived reality of Ugandan villagers at the investment site. Whilst carbon
capture is possible, it is outweighed by a suite of social and environ-
ment ills, including forced dispossession, biodiversity loss and chemical
pollution.” This Ugandan experience has broader resonance. It is similar
to what we see in Myanmar where the ongoing transformation of much
of Northern Shan State’s once-biodiverse and variegated land uses into
an increasingly uniform small farm-based corn monoculture sub-
ordinated to merchant capital (Woods, 2015), is a manifestation of the
direct connection between climate change politics and land grabs
where biodiversity is just one of society’s net losses.
Third, climate change politics may or may not lead to or constitute
land grabbing in one place; the same climate change politics, however,
could trigger land grabbing elsewhere. On some occasions, mitigation
and adaptation initiatives such as REDD+, like the conservation project
in Prey Lang forest in Cambodia, may have blocked agribusiness ex-
pansion inside the cordoned conservation area,4 but an agribusiness
company may simply shift to a nearby area for their expansion. The
implication of this is that if we limit our analysis of mitigation and
adaptation projects within the specific fenced area of conservation, we
will fail to see the indirectly related expansion of land grabs elsewhere.
It is somewhat like a balloon: press it here and it will blow up there.
When a big conservation organization started to claim the Lenya Forest
in Myeik and Kawthaung Districts in southeastern Myanmar, a Korean
company (MAC) simply carved out its 100,000 acres from the outlying
portion of the Lenya forest for oil palm plantation.5 This has prompted
some scholars, such as Hunsberger et al. (2017) and Barbesgaard
(2019) to argue for a ‘landscape’ approach in one’s political economy
and ecology analysis of climate change politics and resource grabs.
3. Land grabs undermine (potentially genuine) climate change
mitigation and adaptation
Another major point of connection between climate change politics
and land grabbing is when land grabbing undermines actual activities
that constitute climate change mitigation and adaptation, and this can
happen in at least three ways.
First, land grabs can block potentially genuine mitigation and
adaptation projects by taking over, or significantly reducing the size of,
the area meant for or suitable to the latter. This is especially in the
context that natural resources (land, water, forests) are finite resources,
and recasting land control and use becomes a zero sum process. A closer
look at the Prey Lang forest in Cambodia reveals how the Economic
Land Concessions (ELCs) (the government program that is largely
credited for massive land deals or land grabs) trimmed down the size of
forest conservation by taking over significant areas in and around this
huge natural forest, contributing to transforming Prey Lang forest into
something like a reduced block of Swiss cheese with many holes inside.6
This is not unique to Cambodia. Many of the so-called conservation sites
worldwide demonstrate similar characteristics, including among others
the Lenya Forest in Myeik and Kawthaung Districts in Myanmar, and
the southern Sierra Madre in the Philippines – the latter is at the same
time the site of the largest REDD+project in the country (200,000 ha)
and a hotspot of land grabbing for tourism, real estate and other cor-
porate investments, speculative or otherwise.7
Second, the sheer scale in terms of land area that corporations have
taken over or are taking over for agribusiness expansion where forest
clearing and use of fossil energy (fuel, chemicals, and so on) is a key
feature can easily outweigh any gains that may be made by mitigation
and adaptation projects. As Davis et al. (2015: 772) concluded in their
quantitative study of the Cambodian experience between 2000 and
2012: “Nearly half of the area where concessions were granted between
2000 and 2012 was forested in 2000; this area then represented 12.4%
of forest land cover in Cambodia. Within concessions, the annual rate of
forest loss was between 29% and 105% higher than in comparable land
areas outside concessions.” Indeed, it is like putting one thing into
someone’s left pocket, while taking five things from her right pocket.
Practitioners and researchers, if preoccupied with the size of a specific
mitigation and adaptation project in a particular project site, could easily
miss seeing the larger setting and broader political economic and eco-
logical interconnections. Thus, one may get caught up in celebrating the
gains of a 10,000-ha. REDD+project, even when in the same subna-
tional region a 100,000-ha forested area was just cleared to open an oil
palm plantation. If we take an ‘isolationist view’ focused on the
REDD+project alone, then we will end up concluding that society
gained 10,000 ha in its equivalent GHG savings;8 yet broadening the
view to include the 100,000-ha clear-cut forest in the adjacent com-
munity reveals, in fact, the society had a net loss of 90,000 ha or its
equivalent in terms of GHG emission.
What is likewise problematic in this context is how ‘genuine’ miti-
gation and adaptation initiatives tends to be limited only to those of-
ficially labeled by governments or big NGOs as such; and everything
else outside the official glossary and maps are rendered not real miti-
gation and adaptation, and therefore up ‘for grabs’. In this way, many
long-standing practices by communities that are embedded in their
socio-cultural and agro-ecological traditions – e.g. community forest as
traditional storm surge protection, and so on –have been invisibilized.
Invisibilizing such practices is often based on prior assumptions, or
could lead to future assumptions, that such geographic spaces are idle
or vacant, and their land uses inefficient or destructive, or both.
Scheidel and Work (2018) have documented and demonstrated how the
long-standing community-based forest conservation work of rural vil-
lagers in Prey Lang region of Cambodia had been undermined not only
by straightforward ELCs – but by ‘reforestation projects’ invoked in the
name of climate change mitigation, that is, industrial monoculture
acacia tree plantation that have been built after clear-cutting and
burning rural villagers’ community forest.9 Indeed, such narrative of
economically inefficient and ecologically destructive poor peasant
agricultural practices could easily lead to justifications for the state to
claim those spaces for its own development projects, or giving these
away to private investors (e.g. tourist business clear-cutting mangrove
forests), as what has happened in many parts of Myanmar, Cambodia
and the Philippines.10
Third, the character of production systems in the emerging en-
terprises in land grab sites can cancel out any gains in carbon savings
from mitigation and adaptation projects. The volume of carbon that can
4 Based on one of the author’s fieldwork in Prey Land Forest and adjacent
communities, 2015-2016. See also Work and Thuon (2017).
5 Based on fieldwork by the authors in Lenya Forest in 2015 and several
subsequent workshops with affected villagers during the period of 2015-2018 in
Myeik and Kawthaung Districts, Myanmar. In Brazil, at an even larger scale, the
surge of agribusiness in the Matopiba region in recent years and the movement
of corporations and gauchos (well to do farmers of European descent) into
Matopiba region has been triggered partly by environmental and climate
change mitigation initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon (Calmon, 2017).
6 Based on author’s fieldwork in Prey Lang forest in 2015-2016; see also Work
and Thuon (2017).
7 Based on fieldwork by one of the authors in southern Sierra Madre towns of
Infanta, Nakar and Real during the period of 2015-2018.
8 See Corbera (2012) and Lawlor et al. (2010) for critical reflections and
cautionary notes on REDD+.
9 One of the authors did fieldwork in 2015-2016 in this case together with the
cited authors Scheidel and Work.
10 This sentiment was raised quite often during interviews and discussions
with local community leaders in our research sites in Cambodia, Myanmar and
the Philippines, and was most powerfully articulated by a Karen community
leader (Saw Frankie) in an interview with one of the authors in September 2015
in Dawei.
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be saved by conserving 10,000 ha of forest can be easily cancelled out
by the volume of emissions in clearing forest and using peat lands and
setting up an industrial, mechanized, and chemical-based monoculture
in 100,000 ha or a sprawling 20,000 open pit coal mining. Thus, if we
map climate change mitigation and adaptation sites and how much
carbon savings there is on the one hand, and then map the high GHG
emitting monoculture and extractive industry activities (coal mining,
and so on) on the other hand, then we will see a significant mismatch.
Thus, mapping nature conservation areas in isolation from broader
socio-ecological processes can be misleading. Overlaying multiple maps
across sectors: big nature conservation, community forests, agribusiness
land deals, extractive industries, tourism expansion, and so on, such as
the human rights NGO LICADHO’s interactive online map (http://www.
licadho-cambodia.org/land_concessions/) are more appropriate.11
4. Climate change politics used as cover for, and/or to legitimize,
land grabs
Still another point of interconnection between climate change pol-
itics and land grabbing has to do with subterfuge and deception in the
specific context where climate change politics have been, and continue
to be, used as convenient cover for and/or to legitimize land grabs. Indeed
this is at the very heart of green grabbing. However, in most green grabs
at least there are actual concrete links between resource grabs and
environmental justification, such as in the case of biofuels. What will be
demonstrated below is a particular type of green grabs where land deals
are straightforward land grabs and nothing to do with environmental
justifications – but that at some point, climate change narratives are
mobilized in order to provide a convenient cover for what are otherwise
straightforward land grabs. This is illustrated in at least three ways.
First, where large-scale land-oriented enterprises, such as timber
extraction, face regulatory efforts such as a ban on commercial timber
extraction, logging corporations and enterprising individuals (or,
‘timber mafia’ as they are often collectively called in many countries),
may try to bypass these institutional constraints by manipulating cli-
mate change mitigation or adaptation measures for their profit-making
agenda. This is often the case with regard to production of biofuel
feedstocks. In Myanmar and Indonesia, some logging companies, to
advance their timber extraction interests, saw opportunity in the gov-
ernment promotion of an expanding oil palm sector that, in turn, is
underpinned by the rhetoric of producing biofuel. The only way for
logging companies to gain access to forests and engage in legal timber
extraction is to have legal land concession contracts. Companies man-
aged to secure government contracts for agricultural land concession,
ostensibly to set up oil palm plantations. Once they physically got
control of the forested land, they proceeded to clear-cut the forests for
timber extraction, and then leave without ever establishing any oil
palm agribusiness enterprise. In Myanmar, the companies routinely
plant thin rows of oil palm along the road in an effort to conceal or
divert attention away from the logged down forest, indeed a very crude
way of hiding their scheme.12 Unsurprisingly, by 2016, only about one-
fourth of all the lands covered by officially issued land concession
contracts in Myanmar had actual plantation emerging (Woods, 2016).
Second, some corporate investments have features that could easily
be repackaged to look like climate change mitigation or adaptation
measures, even when these were originally conceived and/or remain to
be plain profit-making enterprises that have nothing to do with climate
change politics. The relabeling aims for easier, faster and wider political
and administrative purchase and legitimacy. For example, facing public
criticism and resistance from villagers who were potentially to be dis-
placed by large-scale hydropower projects aimed at servicing mega
industrial and commercial interests, promoters of these hydropower
projects are suddenly (re)packaging these dams as climate change mi-
tigation and adaptation projects. One outcome of this is that those
opposed to the dam project are now labeled as opposed to climate
change mitigation initiatives. The Salween River (or ‘Nu’ in China and
‘Thanlwin’ in Myanmar), the longest free-flowing river in Southeast
Asia has been eyed for hydropower development. Since the 1980s
Myanmar and Thailand have been in talks, and in 1997 the two gov-
ernments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for several
hydropower ‘battery dams’ (e.g., mainly for export of electricity to
China and Thailand) with a combined capacity of 22,500MW to be
built on this one river alone.13 In recent years, there were fierce battles
between resisting villagers and the government over dam projects and
the fact that such projects will not only displace villagers, but will de-
stroy thousand acres of village farm lands. Resistance in the past had
forced the Myanmar government to suspend the projects. However,
recently, the Myanmar government has been developing a national
strategy for complying with international climate change agreements,
and large-scale hydropower development now figures prominently as
the country’s main potential renewable energy source (alongside the
government’s promise for expansion of state forest conservation area)
((MoNREC, 2017). Here, (re)packaging is a discursive strategy played
out at the level of policy declarations and political discourse ostensibly
in order to sell an idea. In the lead-up to the UNFCCC Conference of
Parties in Paris in 2015, the Myanmar Government repackaged some
existing interventions, such as building large-scale hydropower dams
and expanding its generic forest conservation area, as part of its In-
tended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) (Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, 2015). Such efforts may be designed to preempt or
dampen public criticism and debate around controversial projects, or to
‘demonstrate’ to skeptical publics that projects perceived as dubious or
dodgy have a larger social function or are intended to contribute to a
large public good.
Third, many big generic neoliberal nature conservation initiatives
(forest, biodiversity, wildlife) expel villagers from, or curtail (or
threaten to curtail) their access to, forest, water or sea. There are dif-
ferent variations of how nature conservation can lead to dispossession
(Arsel and Büscher, 2012; Büscher and Fletcher, 2015). Increasingly,
generic neoliberal big conservation initiatives are explicitly or im-
plicitly put forward as climate change mitigation and adaptation. In-
deed, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the rise of climate change
politics is the sector of big conservation groups working on forestry,
biodiversity and wildlife conservation. Forest conservation projects that
are explicitly labeled as climate change mitigation, specifically REDD
+, while important (Canadell and Raupach, 2008) are just a smaller
part of this much larger generic category of nature conservation and its
link to climate change mitigation. In Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines
and many other countries, government commitment to inter-govern-
mental climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives is usually
focused on the generic nature conservation, more commonly about
claims of protecting and expanding biodiversity and forests (Prescott
et al., 2017).
In some settings, the central state plays a key role in brokering what
seem to be negotiated agreements between corporate land investors and
11 See also the map in Woods (2016) for the case of Tanintharyi region in
Myanmar.
12 Separately and together, the authors interviewed several local villagers and
NGO professionals in Tanintharyi region of Myanmar during the period of
2015-2018, and this is a conclusion among residents and observers that is quite
commonplace. We also travelled across the region and saw for ourselves such
cases where there were thin rows of oil palm trees along the road to cover what
are obviously clear-cut forests.
13 For more background information, see https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/
its-time-to-renegotiate-hydro-contracts-on-the-thanlwin). Also based on au-
thors’ separate fieldwork in Northern Shan State portions of the dam project
(two of the planned seven dams) during the period 2016-2018 See also Lamb
and Nga (2017).
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big conservation organizations, where each seeks to carve out areas of
control in a particular space or territory, with the latter type of orga-
nization often invoking generic climate change mitigation and adap-
tation imperatives to strengthen their case. Negotiated agreements
provide a way for each actor to get a piece of the pie, so to speak, with
experience suggesting that there is often less tension than might be
imagined between agribusiness and big conservation groups – as long as
both get their share of the coveted space. In Cambodia, Myanmar and
the Philippines there are maps that curiously show land investors and
big conservation organizations ‘snuggling’ with each other spatially and
politically in what Work and Thuon (2017) call ‘mutual accommoda-
tion’ between big nature conservationists and agribusiness land grab-
bers. Striking examples include agribusiness-conservation accom-
modations in Prey Lang Forest in Cambodia, in Lenya Forest in Myeik
District in Myanmar, and in the southern portion of the Sierra Madre
forest in the Philippines as mentioned already in several parts of the
paper. This phenomenon and related dynamics, at least in these three
country cases, are well known and well documented (in local lan-
guages) by affected villagers and their local CSO allies. Yet the scientific
and policy making communities, especially those focused on author-
izing climate change mitigation and adaptation, have been slow to re-
cognize (or acknowledge) how often, in practice, climate change miti-
gation starts only where corporate commercial interests agree to stop.
These three broad examples may be more commonplace than pre-
viously thought. Recent publications that we know have also attempted
to cover this angle in a more systematic way include Hunsberger et al.
(2017). Corbera et al. (2017), and Borras and Franco (2018) more
generally, Lamb and Dao (2017) on hydropower in the Mekong region
in Southeast Asia, Work and Thuon (2017) on forest conservation in
Cambodia, Uson (2017) on natural disaster prevention in the Phi-
lippines, Barbesgaard (2019) on ocean-land continuum in southeastern
part of Myanmar, and Soeters and Zoomers (2017) on community-based
adaptation in Africa.
5. Further discussion and conclusion: exploring implications for
policy and political dynamics and research
A key implication of the discussion so far is that addressing global
land grabs and pursuing climate change mitigation and adaptation have
become increasingly inseparable – empirically, analytically and politi-
cally. Global land grabbing and land-oriented climate change politics
are two of the most important defining features of political economic
and ecological changes in the world in the contemporary era. Land
grabs and climate change politics are closely intertwined because: (a)
the main social force that gave birth to them is more or less the same,
namely, capitalism (Moore, 2017), (b) they require and thus compete
over the same natural resources, and (c) political economic and eco-
logical change caused by either of the two in one institutional and
ecological zone can trigger direct and indirect changes in another. That
means the causes, conditions and consequences of the two are in-
herently intertwined, and that for truly effective climate change miti-
gation and adaptation to gain ground, global land grabs have to be
addressed, and vice versa. This can be complicated and can be far more
difficult politically. The reason is because these interconnections often
manifest not in very visible and concrete manner, and thus efforts to
expose these links are not easy, and governing such interconnections
becomes an absurdly difficult challenge, as the contentious policy de-
bates around indirect land use change (ILUC) have initially indicated.
There is one common thread in most of the studies on land grabs,
namely, implicitly or explicitly, some elements of a ‘moral economy’ are
being conjured: the idea that land grabs are of grave concern because
the ‘commons’14 in which ordinary people depend for their livelihood
are being enclosed and rural villagers are displaced – all for the narrow
interest of some corporations for private profit. We see and feel this
kind of angst or concern in most of the studies on land grabs. This
underlying sentiment, however, may not necessarily get played out in
the context of land grabs embedded or cloaked in climate change mi-
tigation and adaptation narrative. When a big conservation organiza-
tion in tandem with large transnational corporations and the central
state move to delegitimize and illegalize swidden agriculture in a large
block of forested area, declaring the same as conservation site to be
emptied of villagers, and a carbon sequestration and trading scheme set
up – such act is not necessarily and always seen by the broader public as
something negative, unlike when high profile corporations moved in to
engage in forest clear-cutting and setting up an oil palm or soya plan-
tation, displacing villagers. In fact, aside from the directly affected
villagers and some of their allies, the public may see such big con-
servation in the name of climate change mitigation as something ur-
gently necessary, and many could easily and uncritically subscribe to
the anti-swidden agriculture discourse. We see this unfold from one
society to another in recent years, as climate change politics penetrate
the countryside and alter existing social relations. Given the discussion
so far in this paper, and if we assume that indeed the broad ways in
which climate change politics overlaps with, triggers or constitutes land
grabbing, the scenario becomes more worrisome, especially because the
political and policy momentum is on the side of such a trajectory,
worldwide.
We may recall that there are, broadly speaking, three political
tendencies apparent in the regulation of global land deals today, as
argued by Borras et al. (2013), namely, (i) regulate in order to facilitate
land deals, (ii) regulate in order to mitigate adverse impacts and
maximize opportunities, and (iii) regulate in order to stop and roll-back
land deals (Borras et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2015). The first two are the
most pervasive and dominant tendencies among relevant actors. Part of
what we are trying to suggest in this paper is that the first two ten-
dencies in efforts at regulating land deals, despite their popularity, are
unlikely to contribute to genuine and effective climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation because in fact they ultimately facilitate the ex-
pansion of global land grabs (Borras et al., 2013). Thus, it is even likely
that the first two tendencies may further undermine potentially genuine
climate change mitigation and adaptation. What we are suggesting here
is straightforward, that is: facilitating genuine climate change mitigation
and adaptation strategies necessarily requires blocking and rollingback land
grabs. Blocking and rollingback land grabs in turn imply social justice
framework in terms of framing political intervention in resource gov-
ernance.
Agrarian justice – that is, the agenda of carrying out a sense of
fairness for historically oppressed social classes and groups in agrarian
societies – has been promoted historically, and can continue to be
promoted today, partly through the twin principles of a ‘guaranteed
minimum land/resource access’ to those who need these resources to
construct a livelihood that is based on either full-time or part-time
farming on the one hand, and a ‘land/resource size ceiling’ that sets a
maximum land size or resource volume (maximum volume of resources
that can be extracted or harvested, for example) that an individual or
corporation can accumulate or extract. Radical land reforms during the
first three quarters of the past century had these twin principles as their
foundational framework. Without these twin principles, individuals and
corporations who have financial ability, or the political connections,
can accumulate as much land or natural resources as they wanted to or
could acquire, leaving less (if not altogether nothing) to marginalized
classes or groups in society who do not have the financial means or
political connection to protect their access to resources or gain new
14 A significant part of the literature on contemporary land enclosure engages
with the concept of the ‘commons’, albeit in varying ways and from multiple
(footnote continued)
theoretical traditions. See Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) for a recent, quantitative
engagement in this discussion.
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access to such resources.
Amidst the global land rush, these fundamental agrarian justice
principles have become even more urgent and necessary. The problem
is that since the early 1980s, neoliberalism had shunned agrarian jus-
tice oriented deep social reforms such as redistributive land policies
(land reform, restitution). Where governments are forced to address
contentious natural resource (land, water, forest) politics, they address
this in piece-meal, project-oriented petty reforms, such as miniscule
formal land titling projects here and there. Overall, in the agrarian front
worldwide, what we saw during the past three decades was the rise of
petty reform incrementalism, shying away from system-wide transfor-
mative social reforms. Thus, resurrecting the necessity of deep social
reforms today becomes a daunting challenge (see Borras and Franco,
2018; Borras, forthcoming 2019).
Moreover, and even more complicated, is that in the past, deep
social reforms were accomplished to varying degrees through the twin
principles of agrarian justice, but often without any clear perspective on
ecologically sound production systems. During the past century – the
century of land reformism between the 1917 Mexican revolution and
the 1979 Sandinista Revolution – land redistribution processes either
paved the way for or have been subordinated to industrial and che-
mical-based monocultures often dominated by agribusiness corpora-
tions. This partly reinforced and expanded the dominant industrial food
system worldwide, which contributes up to a third of global GHG
emissions (McMichael, 2013). The relevance and urgency of agrarian
justice in the era of climate change lies in being reconceptualized and
pursued within a ‘climate justice’ perspective (Borras and Franco,
2018).
Climate justice refers to an agenda of taking the climate crisis ser-
iously and pursuing measures to actually tackle it, while being con-
scious of the role of social relations in the emergence and resolution of
this crisis (Harris, 2009: 36–37). It is motivated by a sense of justice for
both ecology and social classes and groups in society. In the rural world,
climate justice can only be pursued within the context of agrarian
justice, that is, one that asks the fundamental question of ‘why’ some
social classes and groups are vulnerable to climate change in some
particular ways, while others are not (see Ribot, 2014). For example,
forest conservation initiatives in the name of climate change that expel
villagers from the forest, along the tradition of ‘fortress conservation’
(see, e.g. Brockington, 2002), in our view, cannot possibly contribute to
climate justice. This partly builds on the cautionary warning by Adger
et al. (2011) about being blind to the social and cultural impacts of
climate change.
A positive future can only be based on both agrarian justice and climate
justice; indeed, towards a notion of ‘agrarian climate justice’, as Borras
and Franco (2018) argued recently. The recent increasing convergence
of sectoral social justice movements (agrarian movements, fishers’
movements, indigenous peoples’ movements and so on) partly suggests
about the objective imperatives of intertwining issues, and partly pro-
vides some hints that such a notion of ‘agrarian climate justice’ may in
fact hold some potential as a rallying political concept.15
In closing: one of the strategic research frontiers in the study of
global land grabbing is the latter’s intersection with natural resource-
oriented climate change politics, more specifically, the subtle, indirect,
and often invisible forms of such interconnections. We have tried to
demonstrate the ways in which and the extent to which this kinds of
intersection is strategically important, yet remains relatively under-
studied in the academic world. With a view towards shaping future
research, a few analytical points, or rather, potential research ques-
tions, are put forward.
First, the combined extent in terms of possible geographic areas of
coverage of global land grabs and climate change mitigation politics
maybe be more extensive than currently assumed, and merits serious
attention and empirical investigation. It is quite plausible that the
geographic area of global land grabs may have even expanded and land
grabbing gained more political momentum because of climate change
politics. But this is more of an empirical question than a theoretical one,
and thus should be investigated urgently and carefully. Second, the logic
of the intertwining of the two processes shows a far more problematic
situation: land grabbing can undermine genuine climate change miti-
gation and adaptation, while the latter can constitute, trigger, legit-
imize or reinforce the former. If this is the case, a related empirical
question could be: if so, to what extent? Third, the challenge of tackling
global land grabbing from a social justice perspective necessarily brings
in a similarly social justice perspective on climate change politics, and
vice versa. To what extent is this feasible given the balance of social
forces from one nationally bounded society to another, and at the cross-
country and inter-state transnational political-institutional spaces?
Fourth, it has become crucially important to extricate the study and
practice of natural resource-oriented climate change mitigation and
adaptation from its currently too narrow, albeit popular, framing of
largely project-oriented initiatives, e.g. REDD+, carbon sequestration,
mangrove reforestation, or forest conservation project sites – towards
research questions framed in the context of broader and deeper system-
and society-wide perspectives.
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